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SPRING 1962]
PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS: COVERAGE
AND OPERATION FOR CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS.
ARLEN SPECTER'-
T HE GREAT GROWTH of pension and profit sharing plans during
the last quarter century may be overshadowed by their expansion
in the next few years as a result of new laws and increased public
awareness of the benefits such plans offer.' Two of man's fondest
dreams are reducing his taxes and providing financial security for his
retirement. These advantages are attainable through pension and
profit sharing plans which offer him a pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow filled with tax savings and other money the federal govern-
ment compels him to set aside in order to qualify for the tax ad-
vantages. Developments of the last few months make it possible for
professional men in some states to become beneficiaries of pension and
profit sharing plans and changes in laws of the past few years make
it easier for small businessmen to adopt such programs.' At the same
time the self-employed individual and partner cannot qualify.
After considering the expanded coverage of pension and profit
sharing plans, this Article will consider the use of these plans by
closely held corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, and pro-
fessional associations. The owner-employee of the closely held corpora-
tion or professional association is initially concerned with the question
of how he will personally realize tax advantages from the institution of
a pension and profit sharing plan. The major limitation on tax sav-
ings for the owner-employee is the principle that a qualified plan may
not discriminate in favor of shareholders, supervisors, officers or highly
t Member of the Philadelphia Bar. B.A. 1951, University of Pennsylvania,
LL.B. 1956, Yale University.
1. The growth of employee benefit plans is traced in Note, Protection of Bene-
ficiaries Under Employee Benefit Plans, 58 COLuM. L. Rxv. 78, 79-80 (1958). Since
1930 the number of operating plans has multiplied approximately 500 times. P-H
PENSIONS & PROFIT SHARING SIRV. 1 1012. The suggestion has been made that
the growth would have been even greater were it not for the rigid contribution re-
quirements by a qualified plan. Lurie, Plastic Contributions for Pensions And Profit-
Sharing, 67 YALE L.J. 1003 (1958).
2. In 1958 the -enactment of Subchapter S made it possible for certain small
businesses to incorporate so that the shareholder-employees could become bene-
ficiaries of pension and profit sharing plans while the business continued to be taxed
as a partnership for most purposes. BITTKER, FERERAL INcOME TAXATION OF Coi, o-
RATIONs AND SHAREHOLDeRS 403-04 (1959).
(335)
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compensated employees.' Notwithstanding that principle, the courts
and the Commissioner have recognized avenues of advantage for the
preferred employee over other workers. A distillation of cases and
rulings considered herein show that special advantages are available
to preferred employees through limitations on coverage, forfeiture by
temporary employees, larger contributions for certain employees, termi-
nation of the plan and accepted investments of the trust funds. While
the tax adviser is interested in such recipes where his client may have
his cake and eat it too, public policy requires a re-examination of many
facets of the law on pension and profit sharing plans. Special ad-
vantages for some should be eliminated, and coverage for others, such
as the self-employed, should be extended.
HISTORICAL GROWTH SPURRED BY FEDERAL TAX POLICY
The historical trend of pension and profit sharing plans indicates
society's conclusion that they should cover as many people as possible.
Pensions were originally granted to court favorites by kings to express
appreciation for literary, artistic or military achievements.4 The seeds
for modern industrial pension plans were sown in 1794 in Geneva,
Pennsylvania, when the employee's trust was inaugurated' and by
the turn of the twentieth century pension plans were well established on
the American scene, although it was not until the 1930's that pension
and profit sharing programs flourished.6
The rising popularity of pension and profit sharing plans is
attributable to a number of factors. Impetus was given to pension pro-
grams during World War II when they were used to make employ-
ment more attractive since wage stabilization prevented pay boosts.7
Employers have initiated these programs to promote industrial harmony
and stimulate employee loyalty and efficiency.' The requirement that
3. If the employer wishes to discriminate in favor of such employees, he may
set up a non-qualified plan under which the employee is not taxed until he actually
receives' the funds. Durkin, Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 29 U.
CxNc. L. Rzv. 68 (1960). And the employer takes the deduction for contributions
to the trust fund in the year when distribution is made to the beneficiaries. Russell
Manufacturing Company v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 159 (Ct. Cl. 1959) noted
in Note, Employer Contributions to Non-Qualified Profit-Sharing Plan, 28 Gzo.
WASH. L. Rzv. 803 (1960) and Note, Deductible Contributions to Non-Qualified
Profit-Sharing Plans, 58 MICH. L. Rzv. 799 (1960).
4. PRITCHiTr, THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY or PENSIONS 4 (1930); Hickey v.
Pension Board, 378 Pa. 300, 106 A.2d 233 (1954).
5. DRYE, PENSION, STOCK BoNUS & PROFIT SHARING PLANS UNDER THE
FEDERAL TAX LAWS 1 (1945).
6. HANDY, PRIVATE PENSION PLANS AND THE FEDERAL REVENUE ACT 1 (1939).
7. BUREAU OF NATIONAL ArFAIRS, NEGOTIATED PENSION PLANS 1 (1949).
8. WINSLOW, PROFIT SHARING & PENSION PLANS 17 (1946). A survey of 86
companies with pension programs disclosed that 25.6% reported decreased em-
ployee turnover, 27.9% said employee efficiency had increased and 50% felt employee
loyality had improved. Id. at 13. A more recent poll of 139 companies using profit
[VOL. 7: p. 335
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employers bargain collectively on the subject of pension plans has
contributed to their growth.9 However, the greatest stimulus has been
provided by tax advantages awarded to qualified pension and profit
sharing plans." By establishing a qualified plan, the employer may
deduct contributions to pension and profit sharing funds in the year
when made, and beneficiaries' may defer reporting the income until
the year it is actually received." When the beneficiary of a pension or
profit sharing fund receives his entire share in a single year, he is
generally taxed at capital gains rates.'2 In addition, the income earned
by the accumulated fund is not taxed until distributed to the bene-
ficiaries."
The popularity of pension and profit sharing plans increased as
tax rates rose and the pattern of tax advantages obtainable through
their use became well established. As early as 1919 the Department
of Internal Revenue ruled that contributions by a corporation to a
pension fund for its employees and officers were deductible from gross
income. 4 But it was not until the Revenue Act of 1928 that legislation
sharing plans showed 110 rated their programs a success, 28 replied that it had
not been in operation long enough to tell and 1 said the program was unsuccessful.
KNowLTox, PROFIT SHARING PATTERS (1954) reported in P-H, PENSIONS & PRorIT
SHARING SZRV. [ 1023.
9. Note, Legal Problems of Private Pension Plans, 70 HARv. L. Rxv. 490 (1957).
10. INT. Rxv. COnE or 1954, § 401 enumerates the requirements for a qualified
plan. Section 404 provides for deductions for employers' contributions to employees'
trusts. Sections 402 and 403 provide for taxation of employees' trusts and annuities.
Up to 25% of an employee's compensation may be contributed to pension and profit
sharing plans. In addition, a plan may qualify even though employees contribute
up to 10% of their compensation providing employer contributions and benefits are not
geared to employee contributions. Rev. Rul. 59-185, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 86.
11. A participant was taxed on an insurance policy distributed from a pension
trust fund when he borrowed on the policy even though he endorsed the check over
to the employing corporation. 'Lauinger v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 419 (2d Cir.
1960).
12. INT. Rrv. CoDE or 1954, §§ 402, 403. Commissioner v. Miller, 226 F.2d 618
(6th Cir. 1955). The participant will be taxed at capital gain rates if the distribution
takes longer than a year providing the delay is due to administrative problems. Rev.
Rul. 60-292, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 153. However, a participant was taxed at ordinary
rates where he received a lump sum payment of profit sharing benefits rather than
allow his credits to be transferred to a successor corporation in a reorganization.
McGowan v. United States, 277 F2d 613 (7th Cir. 1960). Taxation of single dis-
tribution at capital gains rates was criticized by Eckerman, The Unrationalized Capital
Gains Treatment of Lump-Sum Termination Distributions from Qualified Pension,
Profit-Sharing and Annuity Plans, 7 SyAcusE L. Rzv. 1 (1955).
13. INT. RXv. CODE or 1954, §§ 402, 403. A pension plan will not qualify if a
participant can obtain any funds prior to severance of employment or discontinuance
of the plan; however, a profit sharing plan would not be disqualified if participants
were allowed to withdraw part of the funds in times of financial need. Rev. Rul.
56-693, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 282. Under the provisions of Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a) (1)-(ii) (1956), a profit sharing plan may provide for distribution for reasons such as
illness or lay off. See also Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128 part 5(k). If
the withdrawals result in discriminatory benefits for preferred employees, the plan
can be disqualified. Rev. Rul. 57-587, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 260, However, a partici-
pant may withdraw his own contributions. Rev. Rul. 60-281, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 146;
Rev. Rul. 60-338, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 148.
14. O.D. 110, 2-19-165, 1 CuM. BULL. 224 (1919).
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was enacted to guarantee the deductibility of amounts paid into a trust
to pay reasonable pensions for employees. 5 This congressional assur-
ance inspired widespread growth of actuarily sound pension plans.
The underlying philosophy behind this grant of tax advantage
was to encourage private programs to provide income for retired indi-
viduals. Society's obligation to care for the aged is thus shifted, at least
in part, to the employer. In addition, society is benefited by the
industrial harmony and higher productivity engendered by pension
and profit sharing plans. A beneficial by-product of more recent vintage
is the deflationary postponement of consumer purchasing power. To
make certain that the average employee would be benefited, Congress
provided that tax advantages could not be enjoyed unless pension and
profit sharing plans operated for the exclusive benefit of the employees
and did not discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders, supervisors
or highly compensated employees.1 6
AVAILABILITY OF PLANS FOR PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS,
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
A. The Exclusion of Partners.
The businessman who wants the benefits of pension and profit
sharing plans has been compelled to incorporate because the sole pro-
prietor and partners cannot be beneficiaries of such plans.' 7 This con-
clusion has resulted from the statutory language that a plan should be
for the exclusive benefit of employees. Thus, the partner is eliminated
as a possible participant since he is regarded as the employer.18
The construction prohibiting participation by partners has been
rigidly enforced where corporations were dissolved. When a corpora-
tiOn was transferred into a partnership, stockholders lost their eligibility
for pensions or profit sharing because they were changed from em-
ployees into partners.19 Efforts by stockholders to maintain the guise
of employees after dissolving their corporation have been unsuccessful.
15. HANDY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 8.
16. INT. Riv. CODE oP 1954, § 401 (a) (4).
17. Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128, part 2(i) (1); Rev. Rul. 33,1953-1 CUM. BULL. 287, part 2(b) (1); I.T. 3350, 1940-1 Cum. BULL. 64; I.T. 3268,
1939-1 CuM. BULL. 196. Any employee of the partnership, including a partner's
relative, is eligible to be a participant in a'pension and profit sharing plan. PS No.
23, 9-2-44, 3 CCH 1944 STAND. FiD. TAX SERV. 1 6553.
18. Similarly a program is no longer for the exclusive benefit of the employees
if the corporate employer gains an interest in the fund. In Estate of Aldis, 46 B.T.A.
1171 (1942), a plan was disqualified because the Chrysler Corporation purchased a
deceased employee's interest and thereby became a beneficiary of the profit sharing
fund.
19. Meldrum & Fewsmith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 790, 794 (1953).
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In Bently v. Commissioner"0 the two shareholders dissolved their
corporation, transferred their business to their wives and assumed the
status of employees. The Tax Court held the men were really the
partners in the business and were therefore not qualified to be par-
ticipants in a profit sharing plan.
B. The Limited Partner May Be Eligible.
It is possible that partners who are not general partners may
qualify as employees for pension and profit sharing purposes. An In-
surance Industry Memorandum issued in 1944 suggested that some
partners could qualify as beneficiaries under pension and profit sharing
programs." This memorandum apparently relied on a negative in-
ference from a release by the Bureau of Internal Revenue that "a general
partner, as such, is not an employee of the partnership. "22 Assum-
ing the Bureau release did not use an unnecessary word, it may be
inferred that partners who are not general partners may qualify as
employees for pension and profit sharing purposes.
C. Coverage For Those Who Could and Would Incorporate.
While the general partner and individual proprietor have been
excluded, the businessman could become a beneficiary of a pension and
,profit sharing plan by incorporating and becoming an employee of the
new fictional entity. The complete availability of pension and profit
sharing programs to any businessman who could and would incorporate
is illustrated by the ruling that a plan may be set up for a single em-
ployee of a closely held corporation if the program qualifies on other
grounds. 3
The consequence of allowing only "employees" to be covered under
pension and profit sharing plans created harsh consequences for tax-
payers who could not incorporate or who did not want to be treated
as a corporation for all purposes. The door was virtually closed on the
professional man who could not incorporate because of state law, ethics
or tradition. With enactment of Subchapter S in 1958, some tax-
payers, who did not want to be taxed as corporations generally, have
been able to achieve the status of a corporate employee so that they
20. 14 T.C. 228 (1950), aff'd without opinion 184 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1950).
21. Item VI-25, Insurance Industry Memorandum, 3 CCH 1944 STAND. FD.
TAX SxRv. 1 6269. Some are of the opinion that limited and special partners are in
the same category as general partners. Mackay, Pension Plans and Associations
Taxable as Corporations for Professional Persons, 10 Sw. L.J. 281 (1956).
22. I.T. 3350, 1940-1 CUM. BULL. 64.
23. Rev. Rul. 55-81, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 392.
SPRING 1962]
5
Specter: Pension and Profit Sharing Plans: Coverage and Operation for Clos
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1962
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
become pension and profit sharing plan beneficiaries and still elect
to be taxed as partners. This is not a complete answer for the indi-
vidual proprietor or partner, however, since not all are eligible for
a Subchapter S election and many would not choose that form of busi-
ness organization in any event because of being treated like a corpora-
tion for state and many federal tax purposes.24
D. The Professional Man's Battle To Be A Beneficiary.
The past decade has witnessed the struggle of the professional man
to obtain coverage as a beneficiary of pension and profit sharing plans.
The rule requiring a beneficiary to have the status of an employee
virtually ruled out the professional man who could not incorporate
because of state law, ethics or tradition. But, the desire to save taxes
(like necessity) being the mother of invention, led a group of eight
doctors to circumvent the problem by forming an association under the
laws of Montana. The articles of association provided that the ograniza-
tion was to be treated like a corporation for tax purposes. Federal corpo-
rate income tax and state corporation license taxes were paid by the as-
sociation. Moreover, the articles of association provided for continuity
of existence beyond the lives of the current members, centralized control
and limited liability. Instead of receiving shares of assets of the asso-
ciation, each member received pension benefits. The association set up
a pension plan to cover all employees who had worked for three years
and had attained the age of 30.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue contended that the practice
of medicine was purely personal and the doctors were really the em-
ployers in a partnership. The Commissioner ruled that the association's
contributions to the pension fund were income to the taxpayer and
assessed a deficiency. The taxpayer paid the assessment and sued for
a refund. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Kinter,2 5 held the
pension plan was valid, stating that the doctors were employees of the
association and were therefore eligible to be beneficiaries of a pension
plan.2 6
The same conclusion was reached in Galt v. United States,2 17 when
a number of Texas doctors entered into articles of association covering
24. While a Subchapter S election is in effect, corporate redemptions, liquidations,
reorganizations and many other transactions are governed by the tax law applicable
to corporations rather than partnerships. BrrTxKR, op. c¢t. supra note 2, at 405-06.
25. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
26. While the Commissioner initially rejected the Kinter holding in Rev. Rul.
56-23, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 598, he later ruled that an organization could qualify as an
association for federal tax purposes even if formed for that purpose providing it
had the requisite characteristics. Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 886.
27. 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
[VOL. 7: p. 335
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substantially all matters which would ordinarily be covered in corpora-
tion although Texas law prohibited incorporation by a group of doctors.
The Commissioner determined that the association should be treated as
a partnership for tax purposes and not as a corporation. Reasoning
that Texas law did not prohibit such an association of doctors, the Court
held that the association was entitled to be treated as a corporation
for federal income tax purposes.
The Kinter and Gait decisions placed pressure on the Internal
Revenue Service to define the type of association, if any, which would
qualify as the employer of the professional man. Responding to the
need for a definition of "association" the Internal Revenue Service
issued a regulation, applicable to taxable years subsequent to Decem-
ber 31, 1960, setting forth the "characteristics [which] require it
[an association] to be classified for purposes of taxation as a corpora-
tion rather than as another type of organization such as a partnership
or a trust."2 The Kinter Regulation,29 as it has been called, classifies
the major characteristics of an association as: (1) associates; (2) an
objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom; (3) con-
tinuity of life; (4) centralization of management; (5) liability for
corporate debts limited to corporate property; and (6) free trans-
ferability of interests. Since characteristics (1) and (2) are common
to partnerships and corporations, the Regulation provides that the
determination of the status of a business organization as an association
will be based on whether it has more corporate attributes than non-
corporate characteristics with respect to the four latter items.80
The Regulation defines each characteristic and provides that an
entity shall not be deemed to have a characteristic, whether or not its
instrument of creation provides for it, if it is ineffective under state law.
For example, an agreement by which an organization is established may
provide that the business will be continued by the remaining members
in the event of the death or withdrawal of any member, but such agree-
ment does not establish continuity of life if under local law the death
or withdrawal of any member causes a dissolution of the organization.81
At the same time the Regulation provides that, for purposes of the
28. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
29. In an illuminating article, Wolfman and Price point out that the Internal
Revenue Service's definitions on associations ought to be called the Anti-Kinter
Regulation since the Kinter association could not qualify under the Regulation
because it lacks the requisite continuity of life and centralized management by virtue
of being regulated by the Uniform Partnership Act of Montana. Wolfman &
Price, Qualifying Under Final Kinter Rules Will Be Difficult in Most States, 14
J. TAXATION 105, 108, 110 (1961).
30. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a) (2) (1960).
31. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1) (1960).
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Internal Revenue Code, organizations will be uniformly classified as
a corporation, partnership or trust regardless of the classification by
the state.3 2 While the application of those principles will doubtless
create confusion, the generalization may be drawn that state law will
govern the interpretation of a given characteristic and federal law will
govern the interpretation of what composite of characteristics classi-
fies an organization as a partnership or corporation for tax purposes."
Sound reasoning has led some to conclude that the Kinter Regulation
will bar professional groups in states which have the Uniform Partner-
ship Act from qualifying for pension and profit sharing plans because
local law precludes the business organization from having the requisite
characteristics.3 4
Reacting to the problems posed for professional men attempting
to form associations under existing state law which would qualify
under the Kinter Regulation, many states have revised their partner-
ship laws or enacted new professional corporation or association laws. 5
Connecticut amended its version of the Uniform Partnership Act to al-
low three or more professional men to form associations providing they
had three of the four characteristics of continuity of life, centralized
management, limited liability and free transferability.30 Other juris-
dictions enacted professional corporation laws authorizing one or more
professional men to set up corporations.3 7 A third approach, adopted
by Pennsylvania and some other states, has been the enactment of Pro-
fessional Association Acts which enable professional men to associate
in a manner consistent with the characteristics required by the Kinter
Regulation.3
8
The new state laws are tailor-made to satisfy the requirements
established by the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations. The Pro-
fessional Corporation Acts should enable the shareholder-employee to
obtain the benefits of pension and profit sharing plans like his counter-
part in any business corporation. Laws like the Pennsylvania Pro-
fessional Association Act authorize professional groups to obtain the
32. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
33. In testing certain attributes, the Regulation deviates from the generalization
that local law alone governs. For example, on the question of limited liability, the
Regulation superimposes its own rules. Wolfman & Price, supra note 29, at 109.
34. Id.
35. By the end of 1961, fourteen states had enacted such laws. As of February
1962, seven other states were considering guch legislation. P-H, Pension & Profit
Sharing Service 2-23-62, p. 6.
36. 7 CCH 1961 STAND. FzD. TAX RAP. 1 6444.
37. The State legislation in the first few months after the promulgation of the
Kinter Regulation was summarized in Maier, Don't Confuse Kinter-Type Associations
With New Professional Associations, 15 J. TAXATION 248 (1961).
38. Id. Act of August 7, 1961, No. 416, 7 CCH 1961 STAND. Fin. TAX RAP.
1 6492.
[VOL. 7: p. 335
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characteristics deemed necessary under the Kinter Regulation. The
framework is established so that the association may obtain the requisite
continuity of life, centralized management and transferability of
interests. While the Pennsylvania Act does not limit the associate's
liability to the association's property, 9 the association has a sufficient
preponderance of corporate attributes to qualify under the Kinter Regu-
lation.40
While it is beyond the scope of this article to consider the private
law consequence of these new acts, it should be noted that there are
many ramifications in addition to qualifying for the benefits of pension
and profit sharing plans.4 ' One area of concern is the ethical problem.42
By retaining the same civil liability to the client or patient as before
the formation of the new business unit, the principal ethical doubt
should be removed since there is no interposition of a business organiza-
tion between the professional man and his responsibility to the client-
patient.43
By forming a professional association, the group may be sub-
jecting itself to tax and filing problems under state law. Many problems
are presented as a result of the internal regulation of the professional
39. Similarly, section 12 of Oklahoma's Professional Corporation Act provides
that the new law makes no modification on the liability arising out of the performance
of professional services. 7 CCH 1961 STAND. FzD. TAx Rp. 1 6476. Similarly,
Section 44 of Connecticut's Modified Uniform Partnership Law precludes limitation of
liability for professional misconduct or torts. 7 CCH 1961 STAND. FD. TAX REP.ff 6444.
40. The first example under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1960) classified as an
association the business unit which has three characteristics but does not have limited
liability.
41. Some of the problems for the professional men who seek the benefits of
pension and profit sharing plans are examined in Jones, The Professional Corpora-
tion, 27 FORDHAm L. Rxv. 353 (1958) and Note, Qualified Pension Plans for
Unincorporated Professional Associations, 12 STAN. L. Rtv. 746 (1960).
42. The ethical problems are treated in Jones, Should Lawyers Incorporate, 11
HASTINGS L.J. 150, 153 (1959).
43. While setting forth many caveats, opinions of the American Bar Association
and the Philadelphia Bar Association have concluded that the practice of law by a
professional corporation or association is not a violation of any canon of ethics in
and of itself. American Bar Association Opinion No. 303, is printed in the Phila-
delphia Legal Intelligencer, December 18, 1961, p. 1, col. 1. The Philadelphia Bar
Association Opinion No. 61-7 is printed in the Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer,
December 29, 1961, p. 1, col. 1. The Florida and Oklahoma Supreme Courts have
approved of lawyers practicing under the new professional corporation laws of
those states. In the Matter of the Florida Bar, Case No. 31,073 reported P-H,
Pension & Profit Sharing Service, 12-1-61, p. 6; Oklahoma S.C.B.D. 1378, P-H
Pension & Profit Sharing Service, 2-23-62, p. 6. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled
that the Secretary of State of Ohio was under no clear duty to accept for filing
articles of incorporation which set forth that the corporate purposes is the practice
of law until the Ohio Supreme Court, through its rules for admission to the practice
of law, recognizes the right of a corporate entity to practice law. Green v. Brown,
p. 2-14-62, 30 LW 2415. An opinion from the Attorney General of Pennsylvania
holds that a group of doctors may ethically form an association under the Pennsyl-
vania Professional Association Act. Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer, October 9,
1961.
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group by the new acts. The requirement that interests be freely assign-
able would become problemsome if a shareholder transferred his interest
to one disliked by the remaining associates. However, the problem
may be solved by giving the remaining associates the first right to pur-
chase the interest of the departing interest holder. What rights to
income will an associate have who decides not to contribute his services?
If the association wants to take in a new associate, must all the old
shares be surrendered and all new shares issued in the new proportion?
How can an existing shareholder be compelled to surrender his exist-
ing shares for reduction? These and many other problems must be
resolved by the individual group before the tax advantages will justify
the formation of a new business organization.
THE POSSIBILITY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The rash of state legislation may be the catalyst necessary to spur
enactment of federal legislation, such as Keogh Bill, so that professional
men and other self-employed individuals may obtain tax relief while
providing for their retirement income. Ten years of congressional de-
bate have failed to produce passage of such legislation; however, the
Keogh Bill passed in the House of Representatives and has been
approved by the Senate Finance Committee.44 According to Representa-
tive Keogh, the chances of passage of his bill are good."'
However, passage of the Keogh Bill will not necessarily eliminate
the interest of professional men in forming associations or corporations
because of the restrictions imposed by the proposed legislation. Com-
pared to the benefits available under the Internal Revenue Code at the
present time, the proposed bill imposes many more limitations with
respect to contributions, trust investments, vesting, waiting period and
the age at which benefits may be paid." If the new legislation imposes
the same limitations on "owner-employees" of closely held corporations,
then the professional man will have no incentive to associate or in-
corporate if the tax treatment under those circumstances is to be
identical with that available to the self-employed. But if new legisla-
44. Keogh, Pensions for the Self-Employed, 100 TRusTs & ESTAUS, 175, 176(1961). A brief summary of the history of the Keogh Bill and the attempted legis-
lation which preceded it are set forth in Rapp, The Quest for Tax Equality for
Private Pension Plans: A Short History of the Jenkins-Keogh Bill, 14 TAX L. Rzv.
55 (1958) and Polisher, The Self-Employed Individuals' Retirement Bill of 1959,
37 TAXES 321 (1959).
45. Keogh, supra note 44.
46. Id. Rapp, Pensions for the Self-Employed: The Treasury Department-Finance
Committee Plan, 16 TAX. L. Rgv. 227 (1961). Rapp discusses the Treasury
Department's recommendations for dealing with the "owner-employee" of closely
held corporations at 238 et seq.
[VOL. 7: p. 335
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tion leaves the self-employed in a less advantageous position than the
"owner-employee" in closely held corporations, then the professional
corporation or association under state law may still be useful to obtain
tax advantages.
If the professional man must fit his business organization into an
uncomfortable mold to qualify under professional association or corpora-
tion acts, then prudence dictates awaiting Congressional action since
he may realize similar benefits as a partner or self-employed individual.
However, regardless of whether the taxpayer seeks the benefits of
pension and profit sharing plans as an individual, partner, associate or
corporate employee, he will be vitally concerned with the procedure
for obtaining a favorable ruling on his plan and the advantageous ave-
nues of operation.
A PLAN MAY BE QUALIFIED ALTHOUGH IT ULTIMATELY COVERS
ONLY PREFERRED EMPLOYEES
While Section 401 (a) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code ex-
plicitly provides that a qualified plan may not discriminate in favor of
shareholders, supervisors, officers or highly compensated employees, the
case law indicates that pension and profit sharing programs can attain
qualified status even though they inure to the benefit of preferred em-
ployees. Sound tax planning, however, dictates that the taxpayer should
not press for the last ounce of advantage in order to be certain that his
plans will be qualified. And considerations of public policy suggest that
the areas of preferential treatment should be curtailed.
A plan is considered non-discriminatory if it covers salaried em-
ployees although it excludes all wage earners.4 7 Moreover, a qualified
pension or profit sharing plan may require an employee to work for ten
or fifteen years and remain with a firm until the age of 55 or 65 before
being fully covered. It is not necessary for a qualified plan to grant
an employee a vested right to any of the contributions made by the
employer for his account until he possesses the requisite age and ten-
ure.
48
The decisions show that plans have been upheld where officers and
shareholders have become disproportionate beneficiaries due to the
sporadic nature of the business resulting in large turnover of employees.
In Ryan School Retirement Fund,49 an employee had to Serve the
corporation until the age of 55 with 15 years of service or until he was
47. Marjorie F. Birnie, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 867 (1953).
48. Rev. Rul. 33 part 5(a) (1), 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 267; PS No. 22, 9-2-44,
P-H PENSIONS & PROFIT SHARING SARV. ff 9520.
49. 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
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65 in order to qualify under the pension program. At the plan's in-
ception in 1944, there were 5 officers and 110 other employees. When
the plan was terminated in 1951, the same 5 officers remained while
only 3 of the rank and file employees were still employed. Reasoning
that the statute was not designed to prevent discrimination in favor
of permanent employees, the Tax Court held that ultimate benefits
to all of the officers and a small percentage of the employees did not
disqualify the plan. 0
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was unper-
turbed about discrimination although the number of participants in two
pension and profit sharing plans dropped from 27 in 1943 to 3 in
1945."' Two of the employees who finally qualified were the corpora-
tion's sole shareholders when the plan was adopted. And the Eighth
Circuit has declared that a plan is not disqualified because an employees'
contributions would be forfeited when he terminates his employment
without just cause where the employer would be the judge of what
constituted good cause.52
In Marjorie F. Birnie,53 notwithstanding a decrease in the number
of participating employees in pension and profit sharing programs from
seven to one within a three year period, the Tax Court held that the plans
were organized for the benefit of the firm's employees in general. The
Court categorized the reduction of covered employees as merely
"fortuitous."' ,4
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that a pension plan
was not discriminatory even though shareholders and highly paid em-
ployees derived substantially larger benefits than other employees due,
in part, to the fact that the preferred employees had longer periods of
service than other workers who were employed when the plan was
terminated.55 These decisions illustrate the limits of how plans may
qualify even though ultimately they principally benefit preferred em-
ployees.
50. Id. at 134.
51. The facts of this plan are set forth in H.S.D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F.2d 831(6th Cir. 1951) and Estate of Harold S. Davis, 22 T.C. 807 (1954).
52. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Koehler, 266 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1959).
53. 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 867 (1953).
54. 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 867, 871 (1953).
55. Rev. Rul. 55-60, 1955-1 Cum. BuL,. 37.
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PREFERRED EMPLOYEES ARE BENEFITED BY FORFEITURE,
CONTRIBUTION DIFFERENTIALS AND TERMINATION
OF OTHER EMPLOYEES
A) Forfeiture by Temporary Emplovecs.
Credits forfeited by temporary workers may benefit permanent
employees. Funds which have been credited to a worker's pension or
profit sharing account are forfeited to the trust fund when his em-
ployment is terminated prior to fulfilling the tenure or age requirements
for participation.56 If the plan gives the employee no vested right to any
of the money credited to him, it is all forfeited. Some programs provide
that the employee receives a vested right to a part, such as 10 percent,
of the fund credited to his account for each year he is employed. Under
such a plan, short term employees would forfeit a substantial part of their
credits when they leave the firm. Forfeited pension funds are ordinarily
used to reduce future employer contributions ;5 however, the results of
termination of a plan, discussed below, show that forfeiture may provide
extra benefits for preferred employees. Forfeiture of profit sharing
contributions need not be applied toward amounts the employer will
owe in the future, but discriminatory benefits in favor of preferred
employees are not supposed to result from such forfeitures.58 The
Ryan and Birnie cases show that restriction is only theoretical.
The Ryan case demonstrates how some employees can benefit
from amounts forfeited by short-term workers. About $6,000 was
initially contributed to the pension fund for 5 officers and over $64,000
for 110 rank and file employees. In the next seven years the firm contri-
buted less than $ 2000 and the trust earned about $18,000. One hundred
seven departing employees were paid $19,000 as their share which
had vested prior to their departure. When the plan was terminated,
the 3 remaining employees were credited with $19,000 and the 5 officers,
still with the firm, had $52,000 in their accounts. Thus, even assum-
ing that the entire $18,000 of earnings and the $2,000 subsequently
contributed were credited to the officers, at least $26,000 originally
designated to benefit rank and file employees was shifted to the
56. Irvin B. Schwabe Co., 17 T.C. 1215 (1952). The employer has sub-
stantial discretion in deciding how much, if any, of the contributions should vest in
an employee. Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128, 5(b).
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (i) (1956), as amended T.D. 6301, 1958-2
CuM. BULL. 197; Rev. Rul. 109, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 288. Some forfeitures may be
reallocated in pension plans while retaining the requisite definiteness providing the
reallocations are anticipated in the plan. Rev. Rul. 60-73, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 155.
58. Ryan School Retirement Fund, 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
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officers' accounts. The small contributions by the employer
after the plan's inception and the shift into the accounts of
the officers were not due to having forfeited funds applied against subse-
quent contributions due by the employer. The firm conducted very
little business and employed few people after the first anniversary
of the adoption of the pension plan. The funds were shifted under the
plan's provisions to allocate forfeited funds.
Marjorie F. Birnie further indicates how forfeited funds may bene-
fit preferred employees. 59 There, a $3,300 a year secretary with slightly
more than three years of service was the only employee of 7 to qualify
under a firm's pension plan, and she also received most of the profit
sharing fund. She was paid almost $8,000 of the $11,000 contributed
to the pension and profit sharing funds by her employer due to forfeitures
by departing employees. The Tax Court held that the pension and profit
sharing plans operated for the benefit of the employees in general despite
the fact that the secretary was the primary beneficiary. The Court
said that the secretary was not an officer, shareholder, supervisor or a
highly paid employee, but commented in language strong enough to be
construed as an alternative holding that even if she were classified
as a supervisor, the plan would not be disqualified because it was non-
discriminatory when formulated.
B) Larger Contributions May Be Made For Preferred Employees.
The employer may make larger contributions for officers, share-
holders, supervisors or highly paid employees than for rank and file
workers. Section 401(a) (5) provides that a plan shall not be con-
sidered discriminatory because the benefits bear a uniform relationship
to the employee's total compensation. In Volckening, Inc.,60 approxi-
mately 55 per cent of the corporation's contributions to a pension plan
were credited to two stockholders who owned 97 per cent of the firm's
stock while the other 6 employees received credit for the remaining 45
per cent. The Tax Court held that the plan was non-discriminatory
because the contributions bore a proper relationship to the total compen-
sation of the employees. Similarly, Betty C. Stockvis"t held a pension
plan non-discriminatory even though some employees received larger
benefits than others. In that case the employer contributed 20 per cent
of each employee's yearly earnings to his pension account.
In addition, a firm may contribute larger sums to the accounts of
older employees in order to provide a sound actuarial basis for their
59. 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 867 (1953).
60. 13 T.C. 723 (1949).
61. 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 74 (1951).
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retirement. Since all employees are entitled to retire at the same age62
and since executive employees are likely to be nearer that age at the
plan's inception, larger contributions may be made so that in a few
years there will be sufficient funds to provide for their retirement.
Larger contributions for older shareholders and other highly compen-
sated employees to put their retirement credits on a sound actuarial basis
allowed those individuals to gain substantial advantages over average
workers on the premature termination of a pension plan approved
by the Commissioner. 3
C) Preferred Employees Benefit By Premature Termination.
Premature termination or discontinuance of pension and profit
sharing programs may result in discriminatory benefits for executive
and other preferred employees due to forfeiture by temporary em-
ployees and disproportionately large contributions made to their ac-
counts." Theoretically, the large contributions for older executive
employees are necessary to put them on an actuarial par with younger
workers. However, at termination of the pension or profit sharing
plan, amounts credited to employees become vested."3 Under the In-
ternal Revenue Code highly paid employees are entitled to a credit of
more funds than average employees on a ratio relative to their normal
compensation. But extra contributions to provide actuarially sound
plans for older executive employees will give those individuals a pre-
ferred position when termination of the plan vests all existing credits."
In addition, forfeitures and reallocations to the accounts of remaining
employees in profit sharing plans are likely to have swelled accounts
even beyond what an accelerated schedule requires. Thus, premature
termination presents a broad avenue for the employer to award execu-
tive employees discriminatory benefits.67
Employers have considerable latitude to manipulate the termination
of pension and profit sharing programs which may result in discrimina-
tory benefits for shareholders, officers, supervisors or highly paid em-
62. It is permissible for an employee to retire at an eariler age than that
specified in the plan providing the benefits do not exceed those already vested. Rev.
Rul. 58-151, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 192.
63. Rev. Rul. 60, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 37.
64. The differences between a suspension and discontinuance are considered in
Rev. Rul. 60-2, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 164.
65. Rev. Rul. 186, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 39.
66. Employers can contribute larger sums for employees who are older at the
start of the plan. Mim. 6136, 1947-1 CuM. BULL. 48, 50. But employers are not
permitted to make disproportionate contributions without some apparent justification.
I.T. 3678, 1944-1 CuM. BULL. 321.
67. Ryan School Retirement Fund, 24 T.C. 127 (1955); Rev. Rul. 60, 1955-1
Cum. BULL. 37.
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ployees. The regulations provide that the term "plan" implies a
permanent program.6" Regulation 1.401-1(b)(2) specifies that
abandonment of the plan within a few years after its adoption for any
reason, except business necessity, will be taken as evidence that the
plan was not bona fide from its inception. Elaborating the meaning
of the identical regulation requiring permanency under the 1939 Code,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue said that a plan may be termi-
nated only for a valid reason such as bankruptcy, change of ownership
in an arm's length transaction, a bona fide and substantial change
in stockholding and management or financial inability to continue
meeting the cost of the plan. 9
In practice, less dramatic reasons have been held sufficient to
warrant abandonment of pension and profit sharing plans. Adverse
business conditions, without a showing of real inability to meet the cost
of the plan, have been held to be ample justification to terminate a
program.70  Moreover, the Sixth Circuit undermined the entire re-
quirement of permanency when it said if the Commissioner accurately
interpreted that regulation, it was invalid.7 More recently the Sixth
Circuit has held that an employer may take a deduction and the trust
is exempt where the employer is under no obligation to make the
contribution to a pension trust fund.72 Abandonment and curtailment of
pension and profit sharing plans has been allowed where new employers
needed funds to meet salary increases and for plant expansion.73
Language from some releases from the Bureau of Internal Revenue
state that pension plans "may be terminated at the will of the em-
ployer" or may be ended if the "board of directors deems it inadvisable"
to continue the plan.74
The Commissioner has warned that pension and profit sharing
plans will be retroactively disqualified if they discriminatorily benefit
preferred employees by termination."5 In Mimeograph 5717 issued in
1944, the Commissioner attempted to restrict termination by providing
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (2) (1956), as amended T.D. 6301, 1958-2 Cum.BULL. 197 is identical with Reg. § 118, 39.165-1 under the 1939 Code. Rev. Rul.
57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128, Part 2(g) specifies that a plan must be permanent
and continuing to qualify and prohibits funding at a higher rate for beneficiaries of
pension plans where the plans are later discontinued.
69. Mim. 6136, 1947-1 CuM. BULL. 58. Liquidation of the employer justifies
termination. Rev. Rul. 59-241, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 118.
70. Ryan School Retirement Fund, 24 T.C. 127 (1955) ; Birnie v. Commissioner,
12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 867 (1953); Rev. Rul. 60, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 37.
71. The Commissioner had interpreted permanency to require periodic con-
tributions and a definite formula. Lincoln Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d
326 (6th Cir. 1951).
72. United States v. General Shoe Corp. 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960).
73. Mim. 6136, 1947-1 CUM. BULL. 58 (A) (F).
74. Mim. 5717, 1944-1 CuM. BULL. 321; Rev. Rul. 186, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 39.
75. Rev. Rul. 33, 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 267(e) ; Mim. 6136, 1947-1 CUM. BULL. 58.
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that if a pension plan was terminated or not fully funded any time
within the first ten years, employer contributions for the benefit of the
highest paid 25 employees were limited.-" This restriction was not
severe since at least $20,000 could be set aside for each employee
without incurring this limitation. Moreover, a patient taxpayer could
circumvent Mimeograph 5717 by waiting more than ten years before
terminating his pension program.77 The ineffectiveness of the require-
ment of permanency is illustrated by Blume Knitwear v. Commissioner"8
where a profit sharing plan in operation for one year until disapproved
by the Office of Salary Stabilization was held to have the requisite
permanency.
BUSINESS PROFITS MAY BE SIPHONED OFF THROUGH LARGE
CONTRIBUTIONS IN A SINGLE YEAR
Tax advantages may be realized by making sizable contributions
to a profit sharing fund during prosperous years and later curtailing or
abandoning the program.79 While the Commissioner has said such a
scheme will result in disqualification because of the temporary nature
of the program, ° the case law suggests it can be done. This practice
is impractical for pension programs since fixed contributions are re-
quired, but contributions to profit sharing plans are more flexible. In
Ryan the profit sharing plan was held to be qualified although over
$70,000 was contributed by the employer during the program's first
year when profits were high and less than $2,000 was set aside during
the next six low-profit years until the plan was ended."' In 1956 the
Treasury Department abandoned its rule that profit sharing plans
needed a definite formula for profit contributions."2
76. Mim. 5717, 1944-1 Cum. BULL. 321. A participant was allowed to receive
a lump sum distribution even though he was one of the 25 highest paid employees
and the plan had been in existence less than 10 years where he promised to make
certain repayments if the plan terminated before 10 years which promise was
secured. Rev. Rul. .61-10, 1961 INT. Rgv. BULL. No. 3, at 12.
77. Ibid. The demise of a similar restriction illustrates the Commissioner's
difficulty in imposing effective limitations on pension and profit sharing plans.
I.T. 3674, issued in 1944, provided that a plan would be considered to benefit dis-
criminatorily shareholders if 30% or more of contributions for all employees was
credited to a stockholder who owned more than 10% of voting stock. 1944-1 CuM.
BULL. 315. After the Tax Court weakened this provision by holding it was not an ab-
solute rule, but only could be considered with all the facts, the 30% rule was revoked.
Volckening Inc., 13 T.C. 723 (1949). I.T. 4020, 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 61. Efforts to
enact the 30% rule into the 1954 Code failed. P-H PENSION & PROIr SHARING SERv.
ff 4091.
78. 9 T.C. 1179 (1947).
79. But to qualify as a profit sharing plan, the contributions must depend on
and be geared to profits. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Koehler, 266 F.2d 190 (8th
Cir. 1959).
80. PS No. 7, 7-29-44, 3 CCH 1944 STAND. FED. TAX SERv. IT 6498.
81. Ryan School Retirement Fund, 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
82. Lurie, Plastic Contributions for Pension and Profit Sharing, 67 YALE L.J.
1003 (1958).
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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Lincoln
Electric Company's profit sharing plan was qualified even though the
employer made only a single million dollar contribution."3 However,
deductible contributions cannot exceed 10 per cent of the employee's
compensation for the pension fund and 15 per cent of the worker's pay
for the profit sharing plan.8" Preferred employees or shareholder em-
ployees may thus receive these large contributions from high profit
periods staggered through later years or in a lump sum at capital gains
rates.
THE EMPLOYER MAY CONTROL THE TRUST FUND'S INVESTMENTS
The employing corporation or partnership may retain indirect
control over the funds contributed to pension or profit sharing trusts.8 5
It was noted that 86 per cent of all pension programs are administered
unilaterally by the employers."0 This is possible so long as the invest-
ment policy of the trust is for the exclusive benefit of the employees.8"
By setting up a trust and designating trustees who are interested in or
confident of the firm's future prospects, the employer can use the con-
tributed funds by inducing the trustee to invest in his business. In
Forcum-James Co.,88 seven of eight trustees of a qualified pension fund,
who had the complete power to make all trust investments, were officers
of the corporation and owned 73 per cent of its stock. The Tax Court
held a plan qualified when two of three pension fund trustees were
corporate officers, and one was a 90 per cent shareholder.8" There is
authority for the proposition that a corporation may act as the trustee
of a qualified plan without having a formal trust arrangement set up.
The Second Circuit reached that result, but commented that the
83. Lincoln Electric v. Commissioner, 190 F2d 326 (6th Cir. 1951).
84. IN . Rxv. Copg or 1954, § 404(a) (1) (A) and 404(a) (3) (A). When pen-
sion and profit sharing plans are combined, 25% of the employees compensation may
be contributed. § 404 (a) (7). However, the contributions when added to other
pay cannot exceed reasonable compensation. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-i (4) (b)(1956). It has been suggested that reasonableness of compensation should bejudged on the value of the overall plan to the employer compared to the cost
rather than the compensation paid to an individual employee. Note, Legal Problems
of Private Pension Plans, 70 H,*av. L. Rv. 490, 491-92 (1957). The shareholders'
derivative suit is another check to guarantee that the executive is not overpaid.
Note, Corporations-Pension Plan-Stock, 33 TUL. L. Rzv. 677 (1959). The obser-
vation has been made that contributions to profit sharing plans are less subject to
attack as unreasonable than in pension plans since the former are geared to profits.
Rothman, Variability of Annual Contributions, 100 TRUSTS & EsTATeS 302 (1961).
85. For a detailed analysis of the limitations imposed by the regulations on
trust investments, see Goodman, Strict Rules Limit Investments of Qualified Pension
and Profit Plans, 14 J. TAxATioN 153 (1961).
86. Note, Protection of Beneficiaries Under Employee Benefit Plans, 58 COLuM.
L. Rzv. 78, 82 (1958).
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (3) (1956) as amended T.D. 6301, 1958-2 CuM.
BULL. 197.
88. 7 T.C. 1195 (1946).
89. Irvin B. Schwabe Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1215 (1952).
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arrangement qualified as a trust because the corporation did not invest
in its own stock.90 If an employer desires that pension and profit
sharing funds be invested in his business, caution dictates that the trustee
should make the investment under an independent trust arrangement.
THETRUST FUND MAY BE INVESTED IN THE EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS
The Internal Revenue Code, regulations and revenue rulings seek
to impose no limitations on what the trust fund may be invested in as
long as it is for the exclusive benefit of the employees."1 However,
if the plan is a subterfuge for the distribution of profits to stockholders.
it will not qualify as a program for the exclusive benefit of employees. 2
A statutory limitation on trust fund ventures, section 503(c) (1) of
the Internal Revenue Code, provides that a trust will lose its tax
exempt status if it engages in certain prohibited transactions such as
loaning any part of its income or corpus without adequate security.
The regulations permit trust funds to be used for any investments per-
mitted by the trust instrument and local law.93 Therefore, investments
in the employer's business, loans to the employer and leases of real or
personal property are permitted if full disclosure is made so that the
transaction is for the exclusive benefit of the employees.94 The security
of the investment and the reasonableness of the rate of return are im-
portant factors in evaluating whether the investment was made in the
sole interest of the employees. 5 It has been recognized that the trust
funds may be used to acquire all of the employer's stock.96
Investments must be made with a view to providing sufficient
liquidity for distributions in accordance with the terms of the plan and
90. Tavanes Watch Co. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1949).
91. There are other. regulations about which the administrator must be con-
cerned. The application to pension and profit sharing plans of the Federal Welfare
And Pension Plan Act, effective January 1, 1959, is considered by Arends, Pension
and Profit Sharing Plans - Fact and Friction, 3 Auiz. L. RZv. 61, 70-72 (1961). It
has also been suggested that such plans may be subject to federal and state securities
acts. Note, The Profit-Sharing Method of Providing for Employee Retirement In-
come, 41 IowA L. Rv. 277, 283 (1956).
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (3) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6301, 1958-2
CUM. BULL. 197 is identical with Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.165-1 (a) (4) under the
1939 Code; Rev. Rul. 33, 1953-1 Cume. BULL. 267, 271(g) ; I.T. 4020, 1950-2 CuM.
BULL.. 61.
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (5) (i) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6301, 1958-2
Cum. BULL. 197.
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(5)(ii) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6301, 1958-2
CUM. BULL. 197. A detailed analysis of permissible investments is set forth in
Note, Investment of Pension and Profit-Sharing Trust Funds in the Employer's
Business under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 45 MINN. L. Rlv. 575 (1961).
95. Rev. Rul. 33, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 267, part 2(i). Treas. Reg. § 1.503
(c)-I (b) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6301, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 197, requires that
there be adequate security for any loan by the trust fund.
96. Goodman, Strict Rules Limit Inzestments of Qualificd Pension and Profit
Plans, 14 J. TAXATION 153 (1961).
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a fair return to the trust, and the cost must not exceed the fair market
value.9" When a ruling is sought to determine whether an investment
in the employer's business qualifies as being for the exclusive benefit
of the employees, the following factors are considered: nature and
amount of the investment, annual yield, restrictions on marketability,
collateral, total trust assets, total trust investments in stock or securities
of the employer, percentage of total assets invested in stock or securities
of the employer, nature of the employer's business, and the liquidity
and diversification of the trust investments.9"
H.S.D. Company v. Kavanagh99 illustrates the extensive manner
in which pension and profit sharing funds may be invested in an em-
ployer's business. The H.S.D. Corporation had an authorized capital
of $66,500. On April 30, 1945, the executive employee's trust owned
$48,800 of H.S.D. stock and the other employee's trust owned $11,200
of that corporation's stock."° The initial stock investments were made
by the trustees the day after the trusts were formed and immediately
after the employer made the original contributions.' ° Upon these facts,
the H.S.D. Corporation received a ruling from the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue that the plans met the requirement that such.a program
must be for the exclusive benefit of the employees.1 2 A new Com-
missioner later disagreed with that ruling and litigation ensued. The
Sixth Circuit said that at the very least the taxpayer was entitled to a
jury trial, on its timely demand, since a question of fact was presented be-
cause different inferences might be drawn from the stipulated facts.
However, the H.S.D. Corporation was held to be entitled to a directed
verdict that their pension and profit sharing plan was qualified because
the government did not uphold its burden of proof by sustaining its
affirmative defense that the deduction was improperly taken. The Com-
missioner made no deficiency assessment and did not benefit by the
presumption of having established a prima facie case. When the tax-
payer filed a complaint asking for a refund, the Court said the Com-
missioner assumed the burden of proof in raising the affirmative de-
fense that the deduction was improperly taken.
97. Rev. Rul. 57-163, part 2-k, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128, 135.
98. Goodman, Pension and Profit-Sharing Trust Investments under the Income
Tax Law, 32 TAXES 183, 185 (1954).
99. 88 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Mich. 1949) rev'd 191 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1951).
Control over some employer-corporation has been acquired by a pension trust fund.
Lurie, Plastic Contributions for Pensions and Profit Sharing, 67 YALE L.J. 1003, 1020(1958).
100. 88 F. Supp. 64, 68 (E.D. Mich. 1949). This same program created more
litigation when the widow of one of the shareholders sought to pay only a capital
gain tax on her deceased husband's share. S. Davis, 22 T.C. 807 (1954).
101. 191 F.2d 831, 838 (6th Cir. 1951).
102. Id. at 835.
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Advance Rulings.
It is helpful, although not indispensible, to obtain an advance rul-
ing from Internal Revenue Service that the contemplated plan is
qualified." 3 Upon a request for a ruling accompanied by written instru-
ments setting up a plan and the trust thereunder, the Internal Revenue
Service will issue an advance determination letter advising the re-
questing party as to the qualification of the plan and the exempt status
of the trust.10 4 A conference about a plan in the District Director's
Office is possible only after the plan has been formally submitted.'
The plan may be set up prior to the initial determination as to qualifica-
tion with a provision that contributions will be returned to the em-
ployer if the plan is deemed not to be qualified. 00 Approval is especially
beneficial -since there is authority for the proposition that subsequent
commissioners are bound by the Acts of prior commissioners in ap-
proving pension plans.10 7
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Pension and profit sharing plans should be permitted to include part-
ners and still receive tax advantages. There is no reason to withhold from
members of a partnership the tax benefits that are available to share-
holders in a closely held corporation. Economically, these two business
organizations play very similar roles. In general, their employment
policies are likely to be highly analogous. There is no justification
for placing shareholders in a preferred position merely because in-
corporation endows them with a fictional employer whose employees
they may be in order to qualify as beneficiaries of pension and profit
sharing plans.
The Kinter case has provided the rationale to support classifying
partners as employees for purposes of pensions and profit sharing. In
that case the Ninth Circuit not only said the partners were employees
of the association, but also that they would be considered employees of
the partnership preceding formation of the association in order to give
103. The procedure for advance rulings, amendments and appeals within the
Internal Revenue Service is set forth in Goodman, Pension and Profit Sharing Rulings
and Procedure, 17 N.Y.U. INsTrIruX ON FD. TAX .993 (1959).
104. Rev. Proc. 56-12, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 1029.
105. Rev. Proc. 60-1, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 874.
106. Rev. Rul. 60-276, 1960-2 CuM. BuLL. 150.
107. Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958). There, the
plan was upheld even though significant variations were made after initial approval.
While a later Commissioner challenged a plan approved by a former Commissioner in
H.S.D. Co. v. Cavanagh, discussed in text at footnotes 99-102 supra, it is probable
that the prior approval was very helpful to the taipayer in the Court's judgment.
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them the requisite three years of employment to enable them to qualify
for the pension plan immediately on formation of the association. The
Court said the partners were "employed about the business of the
partnership.'1 8 The "business of the partnership" lends itself well
to being fictionalized as the employer of the partner. It does not possess
the precedent of calling a sole shareholder the employee of the corpora-
tion, but it is equally as logical.
It is similarly logical, and fair, to extend coverage to self-employed
individuals. The rational that the partner is employed on the business
of the partnership could be extended to holding that the individual
is employed and occupied on the operations of the business, which he
happens to own. A "business" could be fictionalized as being the em-
ployer of the individual owner as well the partner. Since the sole-
shareholder, sole-employee of a corporation may qualify as the sole
beneficiary of a pension and profit sharing plan, the individual pro-
prietor should be entitled to the same treatment.
It is unfortunate that the Congress, the courts or the Com-
missioner did not extend the benefits of pension and profit sharing
plans to partners and self-employed individuals before the rash of
state legislation on professional associations and corporations. Ex-
perience may show that professional men will become embroiled in an
unwieldy business unit in order to derive benefits that should be
available to them as partners or self-employed individuals. This situa-
tion is analogous to the flood of state legislation in the 1940s institut-
ing community property law in order to allow husbands and wives
to split their income until federal law was amended to give married
couples in non-community property states the same benefits enjoyed
by spouses in states which had community property laws. Professional
men should have the same rights to be beneficiaries of pension and
profit sharing plans without regard to whether their state legislature
has passed a professional association or corporation law. Fairness and
equality dictate that all taxpayers should have the same rights to
enjoy the tax shelter of pension and profit sharing plans without
regard to where they live or whether they are corporate shareholder-
employees, partners or self-employed individuals.
A requirement that part of the contribution for the employee must
vest in him immediately upon allocation to his account would be a
substantial aid in the elimination of discrimination due to forfeitures of
benefits by workers who terminate their employment before becoming
fully covered. To accomplish this purpose, it should be required that
108. United States v. Kinter, 216 F.2d 418, 427 (9th Cir. 1954).
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ten per cent of the money allocated to each worker's account would
vest in him for each year of his employment. It is true that such a
provision would place a pot of gold of some size at every bend of the
rainbow to replace the requirement that an employee must stay with
a firm until retirement before qualifying for pension benefits. This
basic premise of pension programs must be changed in order to eliminate
discrimination due to forfeitures. The only alternative is to transfer
credits of terminating employees back to the taxable income of the
business. This is undesirable, because the net result would still be
that a pension or profit sharing program would have been established
only for long-term employees.
Eliminating liberal forfeiture provisions would probably not en-
courage workers to leave their employment prior to retirement age
or discourage employers from instituting pension or profit sharing
plans. Employees would still have incentive to remain with the firm,
for only by continuing to be employed until the age specified in the
plan would an employee receive all his benefits or accrue sufficient
credits to receive the benefits calculated to support him at retirement.
More rigid standards should be applied in determining whether
a pension or profit sharing plan should be retroactively disqualified
because of discrimination resulting from premature termination. Termi-
nation should not be permitted at the whim of the employer, but only
for real inability to meet the cost of the plan or a real change in
the status of the employer's business such as dissolution or a sub-
stantial change in stock ownership. The courts should adopt a more
realistic attitude in evaluating the original motive behind plans which
are terminated a short time after they are adopted. While it is not
desirable to make termination so difficult that employers will not be
willing to start a pension or profit sharing plan, the current ease of
termination only invites temporary plans.
Special vigilance should be employed to disqualify plans whose
termination allows older employees to gain vested interests in large
accounts amassed to provide an actuarially sound retirement program
within a relatively short time. If such plans are not disqualified, at
an absolute minimum the part of the funds credited to such employees
because of accelerated contributions due to their advanced age should
be returned to the taxable income of the employer in the year when
contributed. The administrative difficulty of such recalculation would
be much less than total retroactive disqualification of the plan.
The Commissioner and courts should adopt a strict position on
profit sharing plans which are marked by extraordinary contributions
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for a short period of time and then decline to small sums or nothing.
Such situations indicate that the plans are not permanent and that the
taxpayer is merely instituting the program to divert high profits in a
single year. The keystone should be whether it is likely that the plan
will be continued in the same vein judged against the history of the
corporation. Of course, a corporation should not run the risk of having
its plan disqualified because its business goes bad and subsequent
contributions to a profit sharing plan dwindle. However, an evaluation
must be made whether it was intended at the outset that the plan would
be permanent or whether the motive was merely temporary diversion
of corporate profits.
While certain loops in the law should be closed, the problems of
the taxpayer must be kept in mind in formulating tax policy. Since
the taxpayer cannot control or completely predict the profits picture,
his profit sharing plan should not be disqualified because of some varia-
tions in contributions. And the corporate taxpayer should not have his
plan subjected to disqualification because there is a significant turnover
in his employees. Substantial turnover of employees is inevitable for
certain types of business. The requirement of partial vesting should
solve that problem.
CONCLUSION
Public policy has been well served by federal tax laws which have
encouraged the enormous expansion of pension and profit sharing plans
in this century. The tax shelters and opportunity for retirement income
should be extended to partners and the self-employed who are,
realistically viewed, in the same economic position as their corporate
counterparts. The technical rules applicable to the operation of pension
and profit sharing plans for small business units, considered herein,
indicate that certain avenues of advantage for preferred employees
should be closed. But time will probably tell that the long range
benefits derived from pension and profit sharing plans justify liberal tax
treatment.
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